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Abstract
Boolean games are an expressive and natural formalism through which
to investigate problems of strategic interaction in multiagent systems. Al-
though they have been widely studied, almost all previous work on Nash
equilibria in Boolean games has focused on the restricted setting of pure
strategies. This is a shortcoming as finite games are guaranteed to have
at least one equilibrium in mixed strategies, but many simple games fail
to have pure strategy equilibria at all. We address this by showing that
a natural decision problem about mixed equilibria: determining whether
a Boolean game has a mixed strategy equilibrium that guarantees every
player a given payoff, is NEXP-hard. Accordingly, the ǫ variety of the
problem is NEXP-complete. The proof can be adapted to show coNEXP-
hardness of a similar question: whether all Nash equilibria of a Boolean
game guarantee every player at least the given payoff.
1 Introduction
A multiagent environment makes strategic considerations inevitable. Any at-
tempt to explain the behaviour of a system consisting of self-interested agents
cannot ignore the fact that agents’ behaviour may be influenced or completely
determined by the behaviour of other agents in the system. As the field of game
theory concerns itself with precisely these issues, its concepts find fertile ground
in the study of multiagent systems.
A shortcoming of game theoretical techniques is that games, being combi-
natorial objects, are liable to get very large very quickly. Any computational
application of game theory would need alternative representations to the normal
and extensive forms prominent in the economics literature. One such represen-
tation, based on propositional logic, is the Boolean game.
Boolean games were initially introduced as two player games which have an
algebra isomorphic to the Lindenbaum algebra for propositional logic [7]. Since
1
then Boolean games have garnered interest from the multiagent community as a
simple yet expressive framework to model strategic interaction. This has led to
the study of complexity issues involved in reasoning about these games. While
many questions have been answered, the issue of mixed strategies remained
open.
In this paper we address this lacuna and present the first complexity result
about mixed equilibria in the Boolean games literature: the NEXP-hardness of
∃GuaranteeNash, which asks whether a Boolean game has an equilibrium
where each player attains at least v[i] utility, for some input vector v.
1.1 Related Work
Complexity results for Boolean games were first studied in the two player case
by [5] and the n-player case by [3], where among other results the authors
showed that determining the existence of a pure equilibrium is Σp2-complete in
the general case, and can be easier should some restrictions be placed on the goal
formulae of the players. Further enquiry into tractable fragments of Boolean
games was carried out by [6].
Cardinal extensions to Boolean games were considered as weighted Boolean
formula games [8] and satisfiability games [1], where the authors exploited the
connection of a subclass of these games to congestion games [10] to obtain
complexity results about both mixed and pure equilibria.
A very similar framework to Boolean games is that of Boolean circuit games
[11]. There players are equipped with a Boolean circuit with k input gates and
m output gates. The input gates are partitioned among the players, and a
player’s strategy is an assignment of values to the gates under his control. The
output gates encode a binary representation of the player’s utility on a given
input. The authors explore a number of questions about both mixed and pure
equilibria, including the complexity of ∃GuaranteeNash.
Note that a Boolean game can be seen as a very specific type of Boolean
circuit game: the players’ circuits are restricted to NC1, and the number of
output gates to one. Thus easiness results for Boolean circuit games directly
transfer to Boolean games, and hardness results transfer in the other direction.
In particular, this means that the NEXP-completeness of ∃GuaranteeNash
for Boolean circuit games proved by [11] does not imply the result of this paper.
2 Preliminaries
While there are many breeds of games in the literature, we here restrict ourselves
to what is perhaps the most widely used class:
Definition 1. A finite strategic game consists of n players, each equipped with
a finite set of pure strategies, Si, and a utility function ui : S1 × · · · × Sn → R.
An n-tuple of strategies is called a strategy profile: thus a utility function
maps strategy profiles to the reals.
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Example 1. In a game of matching pennies two players are given a coin each
and may choose to display that coin heads or tails up. Player Two seeks to
match the move of Player One, while player one seeks to avoid that. Hence we
have u2(HH) = u2(TT ) = 1, u1(HT ) = u1(TH) = 1, and 0 otherwise.
Note that to represent a finite strategic game explicitly (the normal form
of the game) we would need to list the players’ utility on every possible profile.
This would require on the order of n|Si|n entries, taking Si to mean the size
of the “typical” strategy set. Such a representation is both exponential in the
number of players and linear in the number of strategies: which in itself may
be very large.
Ideally we would wish to avoid such a representation. If a game has some
internal structure, it would be natural to ask if the game can be described in
a more succinct way. In the case where the game can be interpreted as players
holding propositional preferences over Boolean variables the Boolean game offers
precisely that.
Definition 2. A Boolean game is a representation of a finite strategic game
given by n disjoint sets of propositional variables, Φi, and n formulae of propo-
sitional logic, γi.
The intended interpretation is that player i controls the variables in Φi in an
attempt to satisfy γi, which may depend on variables not in player i’s control.
The set of pure strategies of player i is then 2Φi , and his utility function is ν 7→ 1
if ν  γi, and ν 7→ 0 otherwise.
Example 2. Matching pennies can be given a Boolean representation by setting
Φ1 = {p}, Φ2 = {q}, γ1 = ¬(p↔ q) and γ2 = p↔ q.
The size of a Boolean game is thus on the order of n(|Φi| + |γi|). In the
best case γi is small and the resulting representation is linear in the number of
players and logarithmic in the number of strategies, giving greater succinctness
on both fronts.
Having defined the game representation, we now turn to reasoning about
such games. The most common solution concept is the Nash equilibrium, which
we define below.
Definition 3. Given a strategy profile s, we use s−i(σ
′
i) to mean the profile
obtained by replacing the strategy of i in s with σ′i. A best response for i to s
is some σ′i that maximises ui(s−i(σ
′
i)).
A strategy profile s = (σ1, . . . , σn) where every σi is a best response to s is
a Nash equilibrium.
Example 3. In a game of matching pennies, T us a best response for Player One
to HH , and H is a best response for Player Two. The game has no equilibria
in pure strategies.
The fact that games as simple as matching pennies may fail to have a pure
strategy equilibrium casts doubt on its suitability as a solution concept. Fortu-
nately, a natural extension of the framework rectifies the matter.
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Definition 4. A mixed strategy for player i in a finite strategic game is a
probability distribution over Si.
The utility player i obtains from a profile of mixed strategies S is
∑
p(S′)ui(S
′),
where p(S′) is the probability assigned to the pure profile S′ by the mixed strate-
gies in S.
It is in this context that Nash proved his seminal result:
Theorem 1 ([9]). Every finite strategic game has an equilibrium in mixed strate-
gies.
Example 4. The unique equilibrium of matching pennies involves both players
randomising over their sets of strategies by assigning a weight of 0.5 to both H
and T . In this equilibrium both players attain a utility of 0.5.
Since every game has an equilibrium, the algorithmic question of asking
whether an equilibrium exists is not relevant. This motivates decision problems
based on qualified notions of equilibria, such as the one that concerns us in this
paper:
∃GuaranteeNash: Given a Boolean game G and a vector v ∈
[0, 1]n, does G have an equilibrium s such that ui(s) ≥ v[i] for each
player i?
It is natural to also consider a problem closely related to the dual:
∀GuaranteeNash: Given a Boolean game G and a vector v ∈
[0, 1]n, does every equilibrium of G, s, satisfy ui(s) ≥ v[i] for each
player i?
3 Main Result
Our reduction will be from the following NEXP-complete problem:
NEXPTM: Given a non-deterministic Turing machine M , an inte-
ger in binary K and a string w, does M accept w in at most K
steps?
Proposition 1. NEXPTM is NEXP-complete.
Proof. For membership in NEXP, we need only simulate the computation ofM
on w for K steps. Each step can be simulated in non-deterministic polynomial
time, and the number of steps is exponential in |K|.
For hardness, let N be a non-deterministic Turing machine with an expo-
nential time clock f . Let M be a Turing machine with an identical transition
relation to N , but with no internal clock. Clearly, N accepts w if and only if
M accepts w in at most f(w) steps. That is, (M, f(w), w) is a positive instance
of NEXPTM. Moreover, the triple (M, f(w), w) is polynomial in the size of N
and w: |M | ≤ |N |, |w| = |w| and as f(w) ∈ O(2p(|w|)), when written in binary
it is of size at most p(|w|). This gives us the desired reduction.
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We can now prove the hardness of ∃GuaranteeNashF˙or questions of NEXP-
membership, see the discussion below.
Theorem 2. ∃GuaranteeNash for Boolean games is NEXP-hard.
Proof. We will give a reduction from NEXPTM. Given a triple (M,K,w) we
shall construct, in polynomial time, a Boolean game G and a utility vector v,
such that G has an equilibrium where player i’s utility is at least v[i] if and only
if M accepts w in K steps or less.
For convenience, we augmentM with a “do nothing” transition: ifM is at an
accepting state, then we allow it to move to the next computation step without
moving the head, changing state, or writing anything to the tape. It is clear
that augmenting M in such a fashion does not change the language accepted
by M , but it ensures that the machine state is defined at all computation steps;
we do not need to worry about the case where the machine accepts in under K
steps, as if it does, it will still accept at step K.
Let k = |K|, and q be the number of states of M .
A computation history of M on w could be seen as a K × K table, or for
simplicity 2k × 2k, padding as needed. Each row contains the tape contents
and head position at a certain computation step. The number of bits needed to
specify an entry of this table is 2k.
A way to visualise the proof is that in our game G, which consists of six
players, Player One is equipped with variables that allow him to describe a single
entry of this table. Player Four plays a partial matching pennies game against
Player One, thereby forcing Player One to play a mixed strategy randomising
over all entries of the table, and thus specifying an entire computation history
with his mixed strategy. Player Two then verifies that the mixed strategy
provided by Player One contains a consistent description of the head location at
each computation step, and Player Three checks that every two consecutive steps
are linked by exactly one transition rule. Players Five and Six play matching
pennies with Players Two and Three to force them to randomise across all table
entries.
To this end, let:
Φ1 = {Zero1,One1,Head1,Left1,Right1}
∪ {Timei1}1≤i≤k ∪ {Tape
i
1}1≤i≤k ∪ {State
i
1}1≤i≤q.
The intended meaning of Timei1 (respectively Tape
i
1) is the value of the ith
most significant bit of the integer denoting the index of the computation step
(respectively tape cell) in question, given the standard convention of interpreting
“true” as 1 and “false” as 0. A truth assignment by Player One can therefore
be read as: at the computation step specified by Time11, . . . ,Time
k
1 the tape
cell specified by Tape11, . . . ,Tape
k
1 contains 0 if Zero1, 1 if One1 and is blank if
neither. The machine head is hovering over the cell in question if Head1, and
is located to the left or right of that cell respectively if Left1 or Right1. If the
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head is over the cell in question, the machine is in state i if Statei1 (if the head
is not over the cell, Statei1 is a junk variable that has no meaning).
Player One’s goal formula is a conjunction of four subformulae:
γ1 = Init ∧ Final ∧ Cons1 ∧ ¬γ4.
Intuitively, Init means that if the player plays the first computation step,
their description of the machine must agree with the initial configuration of M
on w. Final means that if the player plays the last (Kth) computation step,
the machine must be in an accepting state. Cons1 states the description of the
machine must be internally consistent. The final conjunct is to force the player
to randomise across all computation steps and tape cells, to which we will return
later.
Init requires that at time zero, the configuration of the machine is faithfully
represented by Player One’s play. This takes the form of an implication where
the antecedent states that we are at step zero:
Init = (
∧
1≤i≤k
¬Timei1)→ Consequent .
The consequent itself is a conjunction of three further subformulae, for the head,
the state and the tape.
Consequent = InitHead ∧ InitState ∧ InitTape.
The head requirement states that the head is at the leftmost cell. That is,
at cell zero Head1 is true, and at every other cell Left1 is true:
InitHead =
(
(
∧
1≤i≤k
¬Tape i1)→ Head1
)
∧
(
¬(
∧
1≤i≤k
¬Tapei1)→ Left1
)
.
The state requirement is simply M ’s initial state:
InitState = Stateinitial1 .
The tape requirement is a conjunction of |w|+ 1 implications. The first |w|
implications state that if the tape cell chosen is within the first |w| cells, then
its contents must agree with w. If we use i as shorthand for the conjunction of
tape variables expressing i, and w[i] for Zero1 or One1 depending on the ith bit
of w, this has the following form:
InitTape =
∧
0≤i<|w|
(i→ w[i]) ∧ BlankCells .
Note that this formula is linear in |w|, so the construction so far was poly-
nomial.
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The last formula in InitTape states that all other cells are blank.
BlankCells = ¬(
∨
0≤i<|w|
i)→ (¬Zero1 ∧ ¬One1).
Final states that at computation step K, the machine accepts. If we use
K as shorthand for the appropriate conjunction of time variables, we get the
following implication:
Final = K → Stateaccepting1 .
Cons1 requires that the player’s description of a given computation step and
cell is internally consistent. This means the cell cannot have both 0 and 1 on
it, the head must be either over the cell or to one direction and the machine
must be in exactly one state. It is worth noting that this says nothing about
whether Player One’s description of different steps and cells are consistent with
each other: this is the task of Players Two and Three.
For Cons1, we introduce a generalised XOR symbol, which we denoteOneOf ,
with the interpretation that OneOf (ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) is true if and only if exactly
one ϕi is. Such a symbol could be replaced by a propositional logic formula poly-
nomial in the size of ϕ1, . . . , ϕn - simply take the disjunction of all n admissible
possibilities. This gives us the desired formula:
Cons1 = ¬(Zero1 ∧One1)
∧OneOf (Head1,Left1,Right1)
∧OneOf (Statei1).
By Statei1 we mean State
1
1, . . . , State
q
1.
To finish the description of γ1, we turn to Player Four. Player Four is
playing a partial matching pennies game with Player One over the time and
tape variables. We thus equip her with the following:
Φ4 = {Time
i
4}1≤i≤k ∪ {Tape
i
4}1≤i≤k.
The objective is to guess the same computation step and cell index as player
one:
γ4 =
( ∧
1≤i≤k
(Time i1 ↔ Time
i
4)
)
∧
( ∧
1≤i≤k
(Tapei1 ↔ Tape
i
4)
)
.
Player Two’s purpose is to verify the consistency of Player One’s description
of the head. This involves verifying that at a given computation step the Head1
variable is true in exactly one cell, Left1 is true in every cell to the right and
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Right1 is true in every cell to the left. She controls the following variables:
Φ2 =
{Head2, sHead2,Left2, sLeft2,Right2, sRight2}
∪ {Tapei2}1≤i≤k ∪ {sTape
i
2}1≤i≤k ∪ {Time
i
2}1≤i≤k.
The lowercase “s” can be read as “successor”. The intended meaning of
these variables is that Tape12, . . . ,Tape
k
2 name a cell and sTape
1
2, . . . , sTape
k
2 the
cell directly to the right of it. The other variables state the location of the
head in relation to these two cells at the computation step specified by the time
variables.
Player Two’s goal formula is a conjunction of four subformulae:
γ2 = MatchOne2 ∧ Cons2 ∧ Succ2 ∧ ¬γ5.
Intuitively, MatchOne2 states that Player Two ought to play the same head
configuration as dictated by Player One. Cons2 requires that this configuration
be internally consistent. Succ2 is to ensure that the two cells chosen are indeed
consecutive.
Before we state MatchOne2 we ought to first ask what we mean by saying
that players one and two play the same head configuration. As in any given
(pure) strategy profile, either player will be describing a single computation
step and at most two cells; if it turns out that they are speaking about different
step/cell configurations we should not be concerned about whatever claims they
make. Only in the instance where they happen to refer to the same step/cell
should we expect accord. Since Player Two is referring to two cells in any play,
we require that if either of the cells she references coincides with that referenced
by Player One, they must agree.
The desired formula is thus of the following form:
MatchOne2 =
AgreeTime →
(
(AgreeCell → AgreeHead)
∧ (sAgreeCell → sAgreeHead)
)
.
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The subformulae are as follows:
AgreeTime =
∧
1≤i≤k
(Timei1 ↔ Time
i
2).
AgreeCell =
∧
1≤i≤k
(Tapei1 ↔ Tape
i
2).
sAgreeCell =
∧
1≤i≤k
(Tapei1 ↔ sTape
i
2).
AgreeHead = (Head1 ↔ Head2)
∧ (Left1 ↔ Left2)
∧ (Right1 ↔ Right2).
sAgreeHead = (Head1 ↔ sHead2)
∧ (Left1 ↔ sLeft2)
∧ (Right1 ↔ sRight2).
Internal consistency amounts simply to the conjunction of the valid combi-
nations of claims about the head:
Cons2 = (Right2 ∧ sRight2) ∨ (Right2 ∧ sHead2)
∨ (Head2 ∧ sLeft2) ∨ (Left2 ∧ sLeft2)
Succ2 states that the two tape locations are, in fact, consecutive. We will
prove a lemma to show that this is concisely expressible in propositional logic.
Lemma 1. Let Succ(p1, . . . , pn; q1, . . . , qn) be a formula that is true if and only
if the binary integer encoded by q1, . . . , qn is the successor of the binary integer
encoded by p1, . . . , pn. As a convention, 2
n − 1 has no successor.
Succ(p1, . . . , pn; q1, . . . , qn) can be replaced by a propositional formula of size
polynomial in p1, . . . , pn and q1, . . . , qn.
Proof. We take advantage of the fact that to increment a binary integer we only
need to modify the rightmost consecutive block of 1s, and there are only n such
possible blocks.
Since we have a boundary condition to consider, we require that the first
integer is not 2n − 1:
Succ(p1, . . . , pn; q1, . . . , qn) = ¬(
∧
1≤i≤n
pi) ∧ Succ
′.
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Succ′ is then:
(
¬p1 →
(
q1 ∧
n∧
i=2
(pi ↔ qi)
))
∧
(
(p1 ∧ ¬p2)→
(
¬q1 ∧ q2 ∧
n∧
i=3
(pi ↔ qi)
))
∧
(
(p1 ∧ p2 ∧ ¬p3)→
(
¬q1 ∧ ¬q2 ∧ q3 ∧
n∧
i=4
(pi ↔ qi)
))
...
∧
(
(¬pn ∧
n−1∧
i=1
pi)→
(
(
n−1∧
i=1
¬qi) ∧ qi+1
))
.
This is quadratic in the number of variables, giving us the desired result.
Succ2 can then be stated simply:
Succ2 = Succ(Tape
i
2; sTape
i
2).
Finally, Player Five is trying to guess Player Two’s choice of cell and com-
putation step.
Φ5 = {Time
i
5}1≤i≤k ∪ {Tape
i
5}1≤i≤k.
γ5 =
k∧
i=1
(Tapei2 ↔ Tape
i
5) ∧
k∧
i=1
(Timei2 ↔ Time
i
5).
Player Three’s purpose is to verify that the tape contents in successive com-
putation steps respect the transition rules of M . To do this he specifies a total
of six cells and two computation steps: consecutive triples in consecutive steps.
Then he verifies that the tape contents, head position and machine state are in
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agreement with some rule of M .
Φ3 = {pHead3,Head3, sHead3, npHead3, nHead3,
nsHead3, pZero3,Zero3, sZero3, npZero3,
nZero3, nsZero3, pOne3,One3, sOne3,
npOne3, nOne3, nsOne3}
∪{pStatei3}1≤i≤q ∪ {State
i
3}1≤i≤q
∪{sStatei3}1≤i≤q ∪ {npState
i
3}1≤i≤q
∪{nStatei3}1≤i≤q ∪ {nsState
i
3}1≤i≤q
∪{pTapei3}1≤i≤k ∪ {Tape
i
3}1≤i≤k
∪{sTapei3}1≤i≤k ∪ npTape
i
3}1≤i≤k
∪{nTapei3}1≤i≤k ∪ {nsTape
i
3}1≤i≤k
∪{Timei3}1≤i≤k ∪ {nTime
i
3}1≤i≤k.
The “p” can be read as “predecessor”, referring to the cell to the left, and “n”
as “next computation step”. The intended meaning is simply the state and tape
contents in each of the six cells, as well as whether the head is over that cell.
Player Three’s goal formula is a conjunction of five subformulae:
γ3 = MatchOne3 ∧ Triple ∧ Succ3 ∧ Rules ∧ ¬γ6.
MatchOne3 states that if any of the step/cell pairs named by Player Three
coincide with the one named by Player One, Player Three must agree with
Player One. Triple requires that the three cells named in either computation
step should be a consecutive triple, and the triple at either step must be the
same. Succ3 requires the two computation steps named to be consecutive. Rules
is to verify that the configuration thus described is consistent with a rule of M .
MatchOne3 is a conjunction of a total of six statements, depending on which
step/cell pair coincides with that played by Player One. We will only give one
such statement below, in the case that Player One named the same step as
Time13, . . . ,Time
k
3 and the same cell as pTape
1
3, . . . , pTape
k
3 . The other five
statements are obtained in the obvious manner.
( k∧
i=1
(Time i1 ↔ Time
i
3) ∧
k∧
i=1
(Tapei1 ↔ pTape
i
3)
)
→
(
(Zero1 ↔ pZero3) ∧ (One1 ↔ pOne3)
∧ (Head1 ↔ pHead3) ∧
q∧
i=1
(Statei1 ↔ pState
i
3)
)
.
Triple states that the tape cells selected are consecutive triples, and that the
same triple is chosen in both steps. It is worth noting that given our previous
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definition of successor, if Player Three is to satisfy this conjunct then the middle
cell cannot be 0 or 2k − 1.
Triple = Succ(pTape i3;Tape
i
3)
∧ Succ(Tape i3; sTape
i
3)
∧ Succ(npTape i3; nTape
i
3)
∧ Succ(nTape i3; nsTape
i
3
∧
∧
1≤i≤k
(Tape i3 ↔ nTape
i
3).
Succ3 requires that the computation steps be consecutive:
Succ3 = Succ(Time
i
3; nTime
i
3).
Rules is a conjunction of four formulae: three of the formulae are conjunc-
tions containing an implication for each (r, s) ∈ Q × {0, 1,⊥}, representing the
machine’s behaviour if it reads s in state r and the head is over the left, centre
or right cell respectively. The fourth term is NoHead , to handle the case where
the head is not over any cell in the triple:
Rules = Left ∧Centre ∧ Right ∧ NoHead .
We will examine Left and NoHead , understanding that Centre and Right are
handled in similar fashion.
Left =
( ∧
(r,s)∈Q×{0,1,⊥}
(
(pStater3 ∧ s)→
OneOf (Rule[(r, s)→ (r′, s′, D)])
))
.
The s in the antecedent is meant to be replaced by pZero3, pOne3, or ¬(pZero3∨
pOne3) as appropriate. The intuition of the Rules term is that should the
machine read s in state r it should pick exactly one of the rules available to it,
and if the head is not present then the tape contents should not change.
The subformula to deal with a specific rule can be broken up as follows:
Rule[(r, s)→ (r′, s′, D)] = L ∧B.
L describes the behaviour of the machine if the left cell is not the leftmost cell
on the tape, B deals with the boundary case where it is.
We will give an example of how Rule[(q3, 0)→ (q4, 1, L)] would be handled.
All rules except “do nothing” can be handled similarly, and “do nothing” would
merely assert that if the machine reads an accepting state, then nothing changes.
The L part triggers if the head is over the leftmost cell in the triple, and
the leftmost cell is not cell 0. It then ensures that in the next computation step
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the leftmost cell contains 1 and the other cells are unchanged. Since the head
leaves the monitored triples we need no terms to account for it.
L =
(
¬(
∧
1≤i≤k
¬pTape i3) ∧ pHead3
)
→
(
npOne3 ∧ (Zero3 ↔ nZero3)
∧ (sZero3 ↔ nsZero3) ∧ (One3 ↔ nOne3)
∧ (sOne3 ↔ nsOne3)
)
.
In the boundary case the head is over the leftmost cell of the tape, so when it
attempts to move left it instead stands still.
B =
(
(
∧
1≤i≤k
¬pTape i3) ∧ pHead3
)
→
(
npState43 ∧ npOne3 ∧ npHead3
(Zero3 ↔ nZero3) ∧ (sZero3 ↔ nsZero3)
∧ (One3 ↔ nOne3) ∧ (sOne3 ↔ nsOne3)
)
.
Finally, the NoHead term asserts in the absence of a head the tape contents
do not change.
NoHead = (¬pHead3 ∧ ¬Head3 ∧ ¬sHead3)→(
(pOne3 ↔ npOne3) ∧ (nZero3 ↔ npZero3)
∧ (One3 ↔ nOne3) ∧ (Zero3 ↔ nZero3)
∧ (sOne3 ↔ nsOne3) ∧ (sZero3 ↔ nsZero3)
)
.
This brings us to the last player, who is trying to guess the first step and central
cell chosen by Player Three:
Φ6 = {Time
i
6}1≤i≤k ∪ {Tape
i
6}1≤i≤k.
γ6 =
k∧
i=1
(Tapei3 ↔ Tape
i
6) ∧
k∧
i=1
(Timei3 ↔ Time
i
6).
The construction so far has been polynomial. We now claim that M having
an accepting run on w in at most K steps is equivalent to the constructed
game having a Nash equilibrium where Players One, Two and Three have the
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following guaranteed payoffs:
v[1] =
22k − 1
22k
.
v[2] =
2k(2k − 1)− 1
2k(2k − 1)
.
v[3] =
(2k − 2)(2k − 1)− 1
(2k − 2)(2k − 1)
.
First, supposeM has an accepting run on w in at mostK steps. Consider the
profile where Player One randomises over all step/cell combinations with equal
weight, and at each step/cell combination plays his variables in accordance to
the accepting run. Player Four also randomises over all step/cell combinations
with equal weight. Player Two randomises over all computation steps and the
first 2k − 1 cells. Her other variables she plays in accordance to the run. Player
Five likewise randomises over all steps and the first 2k − 1 cells. Player Three
randomises over the first 2k − 1 steps and the 2k − 2 cells between the first
and last. His other variables he plays in accordance to the run. Player Six
randomises over the same 2k − 1 steps and the 2k − 2 cells.
In such a profile, Players One, Two and Three will satisfy their goals unless
their step/cell combination is guessed by their opponent. Given our setup,
this will happen with probabilities 1/22k, 1/2k(2k − 1) and 1/(2k − 2)(2k − 1)
respectively, giving us the payoffs v[1], v[2] and v[3]. It remains to see that this
profile is in equilibrium.
Let us first consider Players Four through Six. Any pure strategy by Player
Four is a step/cell pair, and hence, given the play of Player One, has a 1/22k
chance of satisfying γ4. Player Four is thus indifferent between the current
situation and any deviation. For Player Five any pure strategy using the first
2k − 1 cells will have a 1/2k(2k − 1) chance of satisfying γ5, and any other
pure strategy 0. Player Five thus likewise has no incentive to deviate. In the
same fashion, any pure strategy for Player Six will satisfy γ6 with probability
1/(2k − 2)(2k − 1) or 0, so she is also indifferent.
In the case of Player One, observe that no matter what pure strategy he
picks, there is a 1/22k chance of Player Four guessing the cell/step component
and thus making γ1 false. It follows that any such strategy will yield at most a
v[1] chance of satisfying γ1. For Player Two, if she picks a pure strategy using
the first 2k − 1 cells there will likewise be a 1/2k(2k − 1) chance of her step/cell
combination being guessed. If she picks a pure strategy using the last cell, she
will be unable to satisfy the Succ2 component of γ2, yielding a utility of 0. For
Player Three, any pure strategy using the 2k − 1 steps and the 2k − 2 cells
randomised over by six will have a 1/(2k − 2)(2k − 1) chance of being guessed,
and any other choice of pure strategy will violate either Triple or Succ3. This
establishes that the described profile is in equilibrium.
Next, suppose that no accepting run exists. We claim that in any equilibrium
Player One will still obtain a utility of v[1], but either Player Two or three will
be unable to secure a payoff of v[2], v[3]. For the first part, note that for any
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choice of step/cell by Player One, the remaining variables can be set to satisfy
Init , Final and Cons1 unilaterally. It is sufficient to simply respect the initial
configuration of the machine at step zero, play an accepting state at step K,
and any internally consistent description elsewhere. Any strategy that does
not satisfy Init , Final and Cons1 is thus dominated and can be excluded from
consideration. All that remains is the choice of cell/step and it is easy to see
that the only equilibrium play would involve giving every pair equal weight.
Player One’s play will thus describe a sequence of 2k configurations of M ,
with the initial configuration at step zero and an accepting state at step K.
However, as M has no accepting run on w in K steps, this sequence cannot
represent a valid computation and a violation must occur somewhere.
If this violation involves the assertion of the presence of more than one head
or the Left1, Right1 variables incorrectly specifying the location of the head, we
claim that Player Two cannot obtain a utility of v[2].
Observe that in this case there must exist two consecutive cells at some time
step where Player One plays one of the following combinations:
Cell i Cell i+ 1
Left1 Right1
Left1 Head1
Head1 Head1
Right1 Left1
Head1 Right1
In this case, should Player Two play a strategy involving cell i, since she is com-
mitted to playing a legal head assignment she will have to disagree with Player
One on either cell i or cell i + 1. This means she will suffer a 1/22k chance of
having MatchOne falsified if Player One plays the cell in question. As there is
still at least a 1/2k(2k − 1) chance of having the cell/step combination guessed
by Player Five, this means the maximum utility Player Two can obtain in this
case is v[2]− 1/22k + 1/22k2k(2k − 1). (The last term is to avoid double count-
ing the case where both Player One and Player Five name the same cell/step
combination.)
Of course, Player Two may opt in this case not to play any strategies involv-
ing cell i. This will however mean that she is randomising over at most (2k− 2)
cells, and Player Five will randomise accordingly, meaning the highest utility
she can obtain is 2
k(2k−2)−1
2k(2k−2)
.
Suppose now that Player One does not make such a violation. The remaining
possibilities for an incorrect run are:
1. The head make an illegal transition.
2. The tape contents undergo an illegal change.
3. The state undergoes an illegal change.
Let us deal with case 1. Suppose between step t and t+1 the head, which is
at cell i at t, performs an illegal transition. This could mean moving more than
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one cell in a direction, moving off the edge of the tape, staying still in a non-
accepting state or moving one cell left or right without a justifying transition
rule. Observe that neither of these possibilities is consistent with the Rules
requirement. As such, should Player Three pick step t and cell i, he will have
to disagree with Player One on the movement of the head, thereby running a
risk of falsifying his formula should Player One play t and i. This will prevent
Player Three from obtaining v3 utility for the same reasoning as with Player
Two.
In case 2, there would exist steps t and t + 1, and a cell i the contents of
which would change without a justifying rule. This, too, would violate Rules.
For case 3, we note that by the machine state we mean the state variable that
occurs in the same cell as the head: the value of the other state variables is of
no account. As such, Rules again would be violated as it requires the correct
state to be propagated to cell hosting the head. This completes the proof.
We can adapt this proof to show that ∀GuaranteeNash is coNEXP-hard.
Note that this does not follow immediately: ∀GuaranteeNash is not sim-
ply the complement of ∃GuaranteeNash. Letting s range over equilibrium
profiles, ∀GuaranteeNash is the question whether:
∀s . ∀i . ui(s) ≥ v[i]
the complement of ∀GuaranteeNash is then:
∃s . ∃i . ui(s) < v[i].
To show that ∀GuaranteeNash is coNEXP-hard we need only show that the
latter problem is NEXP-hard.
Corollary 1. ∀GuaranteeNash is coNEXP-hard.
Proof. We argue that the proof of Theorem 2 can be adapted to show this. Note
that the utilities of Players One, Four, Five and Six did not play a roˆle in the
proof. Those of Four, Five and Six were omitted entirely, whereas Player One
has been seen to achieve v[1] utility in every equilibrium. What remains are
Two and Three, and we will argue that those players could be collapsed into a
single player.
Introduce a new player into the game constructed in the proof of Theorem 2,
Player Seven, with γ7 = γ2 ∧γ3 and Φ7 = ∅. We argue that the Turing machine
M accepts w in at most K steps if and only if there exists an s for which:
u7(s) ≥ 1−
(2k − 2)(2k − 1) + 2k(2k − 1)− 1
2k(2k − 1)(2k − 2)(2k − 1)
.
This can be seen by replicating the argument in the proof: in the presence of
an accepting run, the only way Player Seven can lose utility is if Player Five or
Six guesses the same cell/step, which happens with probabilities 1
2k(2k−1)
and
1
(2k−2)(2k−1)
respectively. Adding a term for double counting and simplifying
yields the quantity above.
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We have thus shown that the following question is NEXP-hard:
∃s . ∃i . ui(s) ≥ v[i].
For the next step, add Player Eight with γ8 = ¬γ7 and Φ8 = ∅. As u8 =
1− u7 the following question is NEXP-hard as well, letting v[8] = 1− v[7]:
∃s . ∃i . ui(s) ≤ v[i].
It remains to show that the inequality can be made strict.
First, observe that we can increase Player Seven’s score, and hence decrease
Player Eight’s, by an arbitrarily small ǫ of a certain form: let γ′7 = γ7 ∨Pennies
where Pennies is a matching pennies game over a new set of variables Φ′7 against
some new player. This will give Player Seven 1/2|Φ
′
7
| additional utility, minus a
double counting term.
All that remains is to show that we can identify a “sufficiently small” ǫ. By
this we mean an ǫ satisfying the following:
∃s . u8(s)− ǫ < v[8] ⇐⇒ ∃s . u8(s) ≤ v[8].
To see that this is possible, recall that if M does not accept w in K steps,
then Player One necessarily specifies an incorrect computation history of the
machine. As we have seen in the proof of Theorem 2, such a violation decreases
the maximum attainable score of Player Two or Three by a fixed amount. It
is thus possible to calculate the maximum attainable utility of Player Seven in
the presence of such a violation, which will give us the bounds within which ǫ
may reside.
This completes the proof.
3.1 Discussion
The preceding proof raises two related questions. To begin with, one may ask
whether six players are necessary. The answer is no: the reader may convince
themselves that one may reduce the number to three in a straightforward fashion
by collapsing Players Two and Three, and Four, Five and Six onto each other,
in a similar fashion to the proof of the corollary. We used six players to simplify
the exposition of the proof. Whether it is further possible to reduce the number
to two is a different matter.
Second: whether there is a membership result to go with the hardness.
Strictly speaking, there is not. As there exist games where every equilibrium
requires irrational weights on the strategies chosen ([9]; [2]) we cannot rely on
the intuitive approach of guessing a strategy profile and checking whether it is
in equilibrium.
One way this problem is addressed in the literature is to restrict attention
to two player games, where a rational equilibrium is guaranteed to exist. This
brings us back to the first question. The second way is to consider the notion
of an ǫ-equilibrium: a profile of strategies where no player can gain more than
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ǫ utility by deviating. This problem, ǫ-∃GuaranteeNash, clearly does belong
to NEXP and the reader can convince themselves that by inserting a sufficiently
small ǫ into the proof above we can establish that it is NEXP-complete.
4 Conclusion
We have shown that the problem of determining whether a Boolean game has a
Nash equilibrium which guarantees each player a certain payoff is NEXP-hard.
This is the first complexity result about mixed equilibria in the Boolean games
framework, and demonstrates that in this instance Boolean games are as difficult
as the more general class of Boolean circuit games.
The complexity of many other natural problems remains open, most signif-
icantly that of Nash: the task of computing a mixed equilibrium. However,
given the difficulty in obtaining this result for normal form games [4] one could
posit that it is unlikely that this can be achieved with the current tools of com-
plexity theory. It would be interesting to see whether there is an exponential
time analogue of PPAD that could lead to a solution to this problem.
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